

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT

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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

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serials within a division size unit on the approach march, which in many cases the Germans took advantage of in gaining initial advantage during a meeting engagement. This of course is not Soviet field manual doctrine but was a result of poor road nets and impassable terrain. Positive action is being taken to improve continuity and compactness of march serials.

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Subordinate commanders are urged to exploit to the fullest any local success, whereas previously, exploiting or pursuing units were given certain objectives to reach at which they were supposed to halt. Now tactical doctrine prescribes no such limits. [redacted] a peculiarity noted by the German officers during World War II, that is, a lack of deep penetration on the part of units subordinate to the division. So consistent was this peculiarity that the Germans could expect the Soviet tank forces of battalions and regiments to stop some four to five kilometers behind the lines after achieving a penetration. This peculiarity did exist as it was commonly called for in operation orders but nowadays there is no such limit placed on exploiting units.

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